In a recent article, the highly respected Russian scholar Sergey Karaganov openly advocated Russia’s use of nuclear weapons as deterrence against Western powers. For the author, despite tough, this is a somewhat necessary measure, as it can prevent an even worse escalation of violence.
As expected, the article was reacted to with a lot of criticism by several Russian and foreign intellectuals. For example, Ilya Fabrichnikov, member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, emphasized in an article published by RT the reasons why he disagrees with Karaganov. The author recalls the hypotheses of the use of nuclear weapons admitted by Russia’s doctrine – although Karaganov openly calls for the reformulation of the nuclear doctrine. He proposes, as an alternative to the use of the extreme arsenal, that Moscow begin to conduct „sophisticated and multidimensional moral-psychological operations, including through the English-language media space they control, aimed at undermining their reserve and willingness to keep going for the long haul“.
In the same vein, Elena Panina, former State Duma deputy and director of the Institute of International Political and Economic Strategies, commented that using nuclear weapons to prevent a global catastrophe would be „as helpful as a guillotine for a headache“. Also, Sergey Poletaev, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project, said that instead of a nuclear strike, a public test in Novaya Zemlya, with broadcasts and streaming in 5D, would be „useful“.
In addition, the respected Moscow-based American political analyst Andrew Korybko also took part in the debate. He published an article on his Substack newsletter calling “excellent points” the Karaganov’s argument that nuclear doctrine needs to be revised, but disagreeing with his calculation on the American reaction in the event of an atomic attack on Europe.
Indeed, it is precisely in Karaganov’s calculation on the American reaction to a Russian attack on Europe that the problem with his proposal lies. To sum it up, he suggests a Russian nuclear incursion into Poland, justifying it with the argument that Washington „would not sacrifice Boston for Poznan“. For him, the attack could be a key for the West to recover the fear of a nuclear escalation and retreat from its war ambitions.
As shocking as Karaganov’s words may seem, they are perfectly in line with the elementary principles of Realpolitik. „Escalate to de-escalate“ is a valuable notion in geostrategy and can prevent, possibly through Machiavellian means, great catastrophes from happening. But it is undeniable that the calculation made by Karaganov is risky and could lead to serious consequences if proved wrong.
Poland is a member of NATO, which practically nullifies the possibilities of seeking a „de-escalation“ with an attack on the country. By this I do not mean that Moscow should or should not do it. On the contrary, considering that Poland is the main route for arms and mercenaries to enter Ukraine and that Polish officials are already advancing the plan to form a „confederation“ with the neo-Nazi regime – being the borders already de facto dissolved -, it is absolutely is reasonable for Russia to decide to strike the command centers in Warsaw. The problem is that in order to do this the Russian authorities must be willing to subsequently face a scenario of total war against the Atlantic alliance. Under NATO’s rules, an attack on a member must be responded to collectively by the entire alliance, so Russia must be ready to deal with it, not counting on the American possible unwillingness to „sacrifice Boston for Poznan“.
From this scenario would come two possibilities: either Karaganov would get his prediction right and NATO would not respond, or Washington would really react, and we would have a nuclear world war. The first hypothesis would lead in the long term to absolute victory for Russia, as the alliance would be demoralized in the face of its cowardice in not complying with its own norms of collective defense, which would certainly lead to a wave of evasion of member countries. The second hypothesis, however, could have the end of the world among its results.
Karaganov may even be right in his calculation, but the risks are not worth a Russian attack on Poland. On the other hand, this does not nullify the wide range of well-founded and irrefutable arguments presented by the author in his article. He attributes the peace that has prevailed since the end of World War II to the fear of atomic hell. Karaganov calls the nuclear bomb an „intervention of the Almighty“ to stimulate fear in men and prevent a final world catastrophe.
His opinion is interesting because it explains the reasons why a Russian nuclear attack would allegedly contribute to the reduction of risks. Western elites, as he claims, really seem to have forgotten what a nuclear war means, so Russia must remind its adversaries that one should never provoke a superpower.
„The fear of atomic escalation must be restored. Otherwise humanity is doomed“, he said.
Karaganov also mentions other sensitive points that cannot be ignored in the nuclear debate. He states, for example, that „introduction of artificial intelligence and the robotization of war increase the risk of unintended escalation“, adding that „machines can act outside the control of confused elites“. In fact, this is something extremely important that has been little commented on by specialists.
In a video that went viral in May, it is possible to see a US Navy Mk 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) targeting what appears to be a civilian 737 plane. The attack did not happen – it is not possible to know if it was prevented by human intervention or not. But the content of the video is enough to warn about the dangers of the exaggerated robotization of Western arsenals. This validates Karaganov’s argument about how irresponsible military technological progress can lead to irreversible damage.
The Russian scholar attributes all these careless maneuvers by the West to a kind of weakening of the „instinct for self-preservation“, which could be easily reversed with a Russian attack on a US ally in Europe. He does not deny the brutal impacts this would have on Russian diplomacy, even speculating that the country would suffer criticism from China, but he emphasizes that „in the end, the victors are not judged. And the saviors are thanked“.
All these arguments pointed out by Karaganov sound valid. Indeed, the West needs to go back to fear and regain its prudence, which really could be achieved through a Russian nuclear escalation. But targeting a NATO and EU member country in this kind of maneuver would be extremely risky, at least for a first strike.
What seems more acceptable is to be attentive to the real scenario of the conflict. NATO’s aggression against Russia is not direct, but waged through a proxy war using the Ukrainian neo-Nazi regime. It is Kiev that physically attacks Russia, although it acts in a non-sovereign way and in defense of Western interests. Indeed, there are European and American mercenaries using NATO’s weapons on the battlefield, but it is the Ukrainian flag that is being defended in the war – at least formally.
So, if Russia had to choose a target for a first nuclear strike, it would be more appropriate to neutralize the direct enemy based in Kiev. The use of tactical weapons against command centers and other strategic targets, enabling the total and immediate neutralization of the regime, would be something beneficial to the Russian interest in deterring the West, forcing it to retreat from its war ambitions, in addition to not implying any right of reaction by the alliance.
Even though it is a proxy for the West, Ukraine is not a member of NATO and does not maintain any kind of collective defense treaty with its Western partners. The Atlantic powers sponsor the regime on a voluntary basis, without any formal obligation imposed by legal terms, such as exists between the members of the US-led pact.
This means that if Moscow attacks Poland, NATO will have an obligation to respond – even if it probably won’t, given the indifference with which Washington treats its allies. On the other hand, if Ukraine were neutralized with atomic weapons, there was nothing NATO could do, and any illegal reaction could be used to trigger Russian nuclear doctrine against Western powers.
In addition, there are other reasons why Ukraine should be targeted rather than NATO countries. The most basic of these reasons is the need to create a strategic linearity of targets. If the nuclear attack on Ukraine failed in its objective of deterring the West, Russia would gain legitimacy to advance its targets. In this scenario, if NATO continued to send mercenaries and weapons to Ukraine across the Polish border, even after a Russian nuclear attack, Warsaw would indeed become a legitimate target. And, in the same sense, if the provocations continued, the other NATO countries, including the US, would be the subsequent targets.
By creating a Ukraine-Europe-US order of targets, Russia gives the West enough time to repeatedly rethink its strategies, giving NATO a number of chances to avoid the final catastrophe. This would also preserve Russian diplomacy to some extent, as the country would be avoiding a direct incursion against NATO, somehow maintaining some level of respect and mutual recognition with the main enemy.
This also takes us to another fundamental point, which is the geopolitical reconfiguration. Russia, Western Europe and the US need to start recognizing each other as equals in a multipolar order. The special military operation itself, as well as Moscow’s current foreign policy, focused on restructuring its regional zone of influence, points to the need to delimit the space of each power in this new order. NATO can no longer advance towards Russian borders because it would be violating Moscow’s legitimate zone of influence – its Grossraum, in the words of the German jurist Carl Schmitt, or its „civilization“, in the terms of the Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin.
By neutralizing Ukraine and avoiding – or postponing – a nuclear attack on Europe or the US, Russia would simultaneously be deterring the enemy and respecting a territorial redline, recognizing NATO’s zone of influence. Moscow would thus be giving the US and Europe the last chance to start treating it as an equal in the new geopolitical order – otherwise, escalation would obviously be inevitable.
Anyway, with all due respect to Sergey Karaganov and all the brilliant thinkers who have been involved in the Russian nuclear debate of the last few days, in my contribution to the topic, I emphasize that I agree with all the arguments listed by the Professor, opposing only his calculation about what would be the best target for a Russian nuclear incursion. The concrete scenario leads me to think that the Kiev regime is, for the time being, the appropriate target for this type of „escalate to de-escalate“ operation.
Obviously, this is not a desirable thing. No sane person in the world wants a nuclear war. But the question that remains for Russians is: until when? Moscow has tolerated violations of its own redlines just to avoid nuclear catastrophe. One by one, all the tolerance limits imposed by Moscow on Western interference were violated without incisive responses.
Since last year, it has been known that Ukraine has dirty bombs supplied by NATO. Kiev has already promoted several attacks with chemical weapons against Russian citizens and recently the resumption of American bio-military activities in Ukraine was reported. This year, the UK began sending radioactive depleted uranium munitions to the regime, as well as long-range missiles. In addition, Kiev has repeatedly lunched incursions into civilian and demilitarized zones of the undisputed Russian territory – as well as attacks on the capital itself, including assassination attempts on President Vladimir Putin.
Some Russian institutionalists could say that these arguments are only enough to justify a non-nuclear escalation, since, apparently, the hypotheses of using extreme arsenal presented in the nuclear doctrine would not yet be touched. But these arguments are already weak in the current context of the conflict. Incursions into the Federation’s undisputed territory can be seen as an existential threat, regardless of their level. Furthermore, the use of depleted uranium is not regulated by international law, and can be interpreted, by the legal principle of analogy, as a nuclear attack, given the (very low, but highly toxic) level of radioactivity of the munitions. These are just rhetorical issues that do not change the undeniable fact that at some point Russia will need to say „no“ to provocations and prevent new redlines from being violated – or, in Karaganov’s words, Russia will have to restore fear in the West.
It seems that the longer Moscow delays in making a nuclear decision against Ukraine, the more difficult it will be to avoid making the same decision in the future against NATO. Although Russia is right to see the conflict as a kind of „civil war“ between sister nations, the truth is that the Ukrainian side is maddened by a neo-Nazi and Russophobic mentality and that reconciliation will in any case be slow and difficult, not seeming the nuclear factor will be so decisive to worsen this inevitable process.
Tough times demand tough decisions. The decision that seems most humanitarian at the present time is not always the most adequate to avoid big catastrophes. It is time for Russia to seriously consider how to bring the special military operation to its final stage.
Lucas Leiroz, journalist, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, international head of Brazil’s Nova Resistência.
Source: www.geopolitika.ru